Studying the definitions in §101 was actually much more illuminating than I even thought it would be. Following are some thoughts on specific definitions. Rather than summaries, I’m only writing about terms where I think there are issues to explore:
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Children: must be actual offspring or legally adopted. Likewise, widow and widower are defined as being the author’s surviving spouse at the time of death, under the law of the author’s state of residence. I’ll be interested to see whether this has implications for the gay marriage debate.
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Computer program. A set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. I’m not sure what they’re going for with “indirectly,” but it sounds suspiciously like any algorithm could, under this definition, be a computer program. It seems to me that this should be patent material if anything. The question of whether computer programs should be patented, copyrighted, or something else (or nothing!) is as old as commercial software, and I’ll be interested to see how the copyright law gets at this. I’ll be looking especially at how the law treats algorithms vis-à-vis their expression within program. Is an algorithm written in Perl a derivative work of one written in C or in plain English?
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Art reproduction. This isn’t actually a term that is defined in the statute, but it appears in the definitions of derivative work and pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. What is strange to me is that Congress is treating art reproductions as works in and of themselves (thus with their own copyright) rather than merely copies of the parent work. If I got permission from his estate, I could, if I were an extraordinary artist, slavishly copy a Miró work and produce a painting that looks just like the original. But should this new painting, which is after all nothing but a direct copy of the original, really be considered a derivative work, subject to its own copyright (which I own)? Surely not.
The Supreme Court has said that “The sine qua non of copyright is originality” (Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)) and that copyright protection is only available for works which contain a “creative spark.” It does not protect non-original works, regardless of the time, effort and the “sweat of the brow” put into creating them. Unless I misunderstand the term, “art reproduction,” I fail to see where there is originality involved. Can it really be equated with translations, musical arrangements and motion picture versions, which clearly do have original content? This is something I will have to look into further.
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Phonorecord is a term I’ve never seen except in the context of copyright. The law takes the set of all material objects which are capable of embodying a work and divides them into two categories: copies and phonorecords. How they draw this distinction is a little unclear to me, though. The definitions of copy and phonorecord state that both are “material objects,” but does it really make sense to take a single object and call it a “phonorecord” if it contains nothing but sound recordings, while calling it a “copy” in every other case? Take, for example, a DVD containing twenty sound files and one audiovisual file. If an object can only be one or the other, we’d be forced to call it a “copy,” but that runs counter to my intuition somehow—I want the sound files to be phonorecords regardless of whether they share space on a disc with an audiovisual file.
Why even bother with making the distinction in the first place? Why not just call any fixation of a work a copy? I suspect that this has to do with the law’s having been written in the days before digital sound, but this will require more research.
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United States work. This definition applies specifically to §411, which I haven’t gotten to yet, but which deals with copyright registration. What is odd is that they seem to have excluded classes of works which I would have assumed would be counted as U.S. works. Foreign works are designated as U.S. works if they are published simultaneously in the U.S. AND a country that is either:
• a “treaty party” whose copyright term is at least as long as that in the U.S., or
• is not a “treaty party.”
However, that means that if the work is published simultaneously in the U.S. and in a country who is a “treaty party,” but whose term is not as long as that of the U.S., then it is not a U.S. work, under this definition. I doubt this will have any impact when we get to copyright in foreign works, but I’ll be interested to see. I’ll note here that the copyright term mandated by the Berne Convention is not as long as the one the U.S. has adopted, so this may exclude quite a number of works published abroad.
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Works of visual art. Is it really necessary to specifically exclude databases and electronic information services from the definition of works of visual art? Would anyone really have thought to classify, say, ArtStor as a work of visual art?!
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Work made for hire. They state that the term should be interpreted as though certain sections of the Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and the IP Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 were never enacted. Wouldn’t it have been better had they written those two laws so that the caveat wasn’t necessary in the first place? I’ve often said that the people writing laws are forgetting how to craft well-written laws. This is an example.